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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4404
Using a recent household survey for two cohorts of 
married women, this paper examines norms about 
gender equality in education for children and adults.  
Among the main findings are that gender education gap 
norms have changed: younger generations of women 
are more positive about female vs. male education, both 
as pertaining to child and adult education outcomes.  
Perhaps the strongest result is that Bangladeshi women 
are more likely to espouse attitudes of gender equality 
in education for their children and less so about gender 
equality among spouses. It is also easier to explain 
norms regarding children’s education and more difficult 
to explain norms about equality in marriages. The 
authors believe that question on relative education of 
boys and girls captures the value of education per se, 
This paper—a product of the South Asia Sustainable Development Department (Social Development Unit)—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to undertake empirical work on issues of equity and inclusion. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mdas@worldbank.org. 
while the question on educational equality in marriage 
captures the norms regarding marriage and the relative 
worth of husbands and wives. The effect of education 
in determining norms is significant though complex, 
and spans own and spousal education, as well as that of 
older females in the household. This indicates sharing 
of education norms effects or externalities arising from 
spousal education in the production of gender education 
gap norms within marriage as well as arising from the 
presence of older educated females in the household.  
Lastly, the authors also find associations between gender 
education gap norms and household poverty, information 
processing and religion, though the evidence here is more 
mixed.  
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“Earlier fathers used to say ‘what is the use of educating girls….they will 
go to another house’. But now, fathers send both daughters and sons to 
school and college.”  School going adolescent girl, Mymensingh 
“ Mothers of the earlier generation used to advise their daughters to learn 
house-work and get education up to primary; now mothers are telling 
their daughters to get at least secondary school certificate”. School going 
adolescent boy, Satkhira 
 Source:  World Bank (2007) 
 
 
Social norms and attitudes are often an indicator of social trends and the demand for 
various goods and services.  They are also often pointers to the trajectory of social 
change.  It is therefore not surprising that norms and attitudes have been studied by 
scholars for now several decades.  The literature on norms and their transformation is rich 
in the US in particular.  During the 1970s Mason et al (1976) looked at changing attitudes 
to women’s work and their domestic roles at a time when the women’s movement in the 
US was gaining strength and women were also entering the labor market in large 
numbers.  This was followed by other scholars trying to assess the importance of 
education in changing “sex role attitudes.”  Still others asked how norms and values 
change, whether behaviors precede norms-change or vice versa.  
We aim to add to this body of work by looking at change in attitudes to some 
aspects of gender equality in Bangladesh during a period of rapid social transformation.  
This work we believe is of particular significance because, while data sets in developed 
countries have allowed for analysis of norms and attitudes to emerge, those from 
developing countries have been few or restricted to small samples and to attitudes to 
reproductive decision-making, sex preferences for children and to violence against 
women.  Also, for the most part the work on developing countries has focused on using 
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attitudes as explanatory variables for a number of outcomes, rather than outcome 
variables in their own right.  
Drawing on the literature on change in “sex-role attitudes” from the US that 
documents changes in attitudes to gender equality (Mason, et al, 1976; Mason and Lu 
1988; Brewster and Padavic, 2000) and a body of literature that assesses the importance 
of education in changing attitudes to gender inequality (Kane and Kyyro, 2001), we ask 
how norms to gender equality in education have changed in Bangladesh and the 
individual level determinants of these attitudes.  While we cannot delineate clear casual 
pathways of change, we try to separate out the correlates of attitudes to gender equality in 
education.  We believe this to be an important area to explore since the major part of 
South Asia suffers from entrenched son preference and low parental investments in girls’ 
education.  Parents do not see the value of educating girls for a number of demand and 
supply side reasons.  This translates into poor educational outcomes for girls in absolute 
terms but also in relation to boys.  We believe that this paper will enrich the empirical 
understanding on norm transformation and on some critical areas of gender inequality. 
The work on education and gender norms has been addressed primarily to see if 
education is a liberalizing influence or a constraint on attitudes to gender equality.  The 
results of this research are equivocal to say the least (Kane, 1995).  We situate the 
analysis on changing attitudes on girls’ education within the overall context of 
educational expansion in Bangladesh and the definitions of sex roles and expectations in 
the culture.      
In the context of the coexistence of conservative gender norms and the far-
reaching changes in the Bangladesh social landscape, including expansion in education 
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we ask the question – what has this meant for social norms and attitudes with regard to 
the education of girls and women?  In particular – what has this meant for attitudes 
towards equal education between girls and boys and husbands and wives?  There are 
several reasons why this is important.  “For although attitudes may fail to influence 
individual behavior in many instances, marked attitude shifts in the population at large 
are likely to produce socio-political climates conducive to structural change”  (Mason, et 
al: 1976:573).  Montgomery (1999) also discusses the value of addressing changes in 
perceptions in response to actual patterns and the manner in which these perceptions can 
fuel further change.  Thus, as populations perceive declining mortality, their effects are 
felt not only in their ability and willingness to regulate fertility behavior but also in the 
fact that social and political agency furthers the cause of better health care and increased 
demand for better quality care.  In this case, we could argue that perceptions of greater 
equality among means and women in education could in turn lead to increase demand for 
better quality education and increased ability of women to access the labor markets, as 
well in terms of greater equality in marital relationships that would all have positive 
bearing on women’s status in Bangladesh. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  We first provide the 
contextual background for studying gender education norms for the specific case of 
Bangladesh.  Next, we present the data and methods underlying the empirical analysis of 
this paper.  We then present the results, whereafter we provide a section discussing the 
most special results from the empirical analysis in more detail.  A final section concludes.   
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BACKGROUND 
Bangladesh provides an interesting context for this analysis.  The growth of education, 
especially secondary education for girls, has been perhaps Bangladesh’s most dramatic 
achievement in the last two decades.  Compared to other low income countries, 
Bangladesh stands out as a shining success story in female secondary education, along 
with countries such as Nicaragua, Vietnam, and some countries of the erstwhile Soviet 
Union.  Bangladesh’s success is especially commendable because the growth in female 
education took place within a democratic regime and started from a really low base.  
What is more startling in Bangladesh is that this spectacular increase in girls’ 
education has led to the reversal of a number of well-established patterns.  First, girls 
gross enrollment at all levels except the highest has outstripped that of boys leading us to 
talk about a “boys left behind” phenomenon (World Bank, 2007; Figure 1 and Table 1).  
Second, there has been a dramatic increase in women who are marrying men less 
educated than them (Table 3, see the next section).  This is a product of the marriage 
market where spousal age-gap has not changed much and younger cohorts of girls are 
more educated than the cohorts of men they marry in a strange “education squeeze.”   
[Figure 1 about here] 
   [Table 1 about here] 
 The growth in education and the attendant social change has probably been the 
most important but there are others as well.  Starting from a very low base of 9 percent, 
female labor force participation picked up to over 22 percent during the years 1993-2003.  
Evocative images of hundreds of young girls walking every morning to the garment 
factories have been etched in the popular imagination as a metaphor for progress.  Infant 
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mortality has dropped faster than in any other country in South Asia and gender 
differences in infant mortality have disappeared, unlike patterns in its neighboring 
countries.  The total fertility rate nearly halved from 6.1 between 1971 and 2001 and the 
microcredit revolution sweeping the countryside has given women visibility and greater 
status.  Better water and sanitation facilities have reduced the drudgery of mothers who 
now have time for other activities.  An information and communication boom has 
accompanied use of radio, television and mobile phones.  A better roads network has 
allowed women to move out of their villages to jobs in town through more secure modes 
of transport and given them greater mobility (World Bank, 2007).   
 The progress recounted above is not meant to undermine the serious problems that 
remain and new ones that are surfacing.  So, while women’s status has improved 
dramatically form the last few decades, gender inequalities in many other areas are 
persistent such as access to markets, political spaces and high tech services.  Moreover, 
there are serious differences by area of residence, wealth quintiles and ethnicity.  The 
practice of dowry is on the rise, and one of the reasons why girls are married off on 
average by the time they are 15 years old.   
 Previously we described the extent to which education has expanded in 
Bangladesh and the manner in which it has trumped the conservative marriage market 
with increasing numbers of girls compared to their mothers’ generation marrying men 
less educated than them.  Clearly then, demand for education is not only contingent on 
cultural reasons and has some important structural correlates.  Bangladesh for the last two 
decades followed a concerted policy to enhance girls’ education through innovative 
incentive schemes that provided stipends to secondary school girls for remaining in 
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school.  NGOs too did their part in enhancing girls’ education and the labor market 
expanded for them simultaneously during the last decade.   
 Despite these changes, there is a coexistence of patriarchal norms and 
conservative attitudes to women’s roles.  It is well-known that male bias in South Asia is 
at the core of a number of negative outcomes for women and girls. The literature 
documenting this and analyzing its correlates throughout the life-cycle in South Asia is 
rich and varied in terms of disciplinary backgrounds.    The basis for this the norm is that 
daughters only “belong” to their natal family until they are married and parents should 
not live with their married daughters or accept financial help from them.  This has led to 
the widely accepted notion that parental investments in girl children are determined by 
their low expected returns in the latter’s old age (Cain, 1978).  One key investment 
relates to education for girls.   
Marriage of girls is central to their upbringing.  The adage that women should be 
less educated than their husbands and in other ways less accomplished is an accepted 
apart of the South Asian culture.  Thus, women marry “up” in a well-known practice of 
hypergamy – wives are thus from lower social status, caste, employment status and 
educational levels than their spouses.  Although some ethnic minorities do not adhere to 
this generally accepted pattern, at the other extreme are Hindu societies which have even 
a ritual ratification for “marrying up” – “anuloma” marriages are acceptable as lower 
caste women can marry higher caste men but “pratiloma” marriages where the women’s 
caste is higher, are ritually unacceptable.  In order to cement the relationship of the 
husband as the enforcer of norms and familial honor, the inter-spouse age difference is 
also substantial and has remained quite resistant to change.  Yet another reason why 
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educating girls at higher levels is considered pointless, is due to the high levels of dowry 
in South Asian cultures.  While this is a singularly un-Islamic practice, it is widely 
prevalent in Bangladesh and from recent accounts, also on the rise (World Bank, 2007).  
Thus, a more educated girl requires a groom who is even more educated and 
accomplished, thus inflating the amount of dowry her family would have to pay for the 
marriage.   
 In other ways too, women and girls are expected to behave in “appropriate” ways.  
One of the key attributes of a “good Bengali girl” for instance is the notion of “shyness” 
or “lojja”, where girls seldom speak their minds before elders and outsiders.  In many 
conservative parts of South Asia, higher education is considered to liberate girls so much 
that they would have problems “adjusting” to their marital home.  During focus group 
discussions we have found that rural populations perceive the impact of girls’ education 
most strongly in the ability of the latter to “speak” and to shed inhibitions.  This is 
variously considered one of the positive or negative effects of education, depending on 
who we are talking to (Das and Hossain, forthcoming; World Bank, 2007).   
 Norms of seclusion or “purdah” in Bangladesh is yet another reason often cited 
for low demand for girls’ education.  Thus, pubescent girls traveling to neighboring 
villages to seek secondary education is considered unacceptable and a risk to the chastity 
and purity of girls, who may then have problems finding suitable, respectable husbands.  
Other research has recently shown that not only is the “purdah mentality” prevalent in 
non-Islamic populations of South Asia (Lateef, 1991; Das, 2004), but even when it is 
practiced, it is so amorphous a concept and so tied up with acceptable notions of safety 
and security than when appropriate conditions exist, it is a scant constraint on girls' 
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education or on women’s labor market participation.  In fact, women and girls renegotiate 
these norms of seclusion when opportunities present themselves (Kabeer, 2001; World 
Bank, 2007).   
 Finally, the demand for female education in Bangladesh and other South Asian 
cultures is considered to be low has been due to low opportunities and returns in the labor 
market.  Several studies on India have argued that low returns to education for women, 
discourage families from educating their daughters (Kingdon and Unni, 1997; Dreze and 
Gazdar, 1996).  Where female labor is valued only in the home and the labor force 
participation rate in India, Bangladesh or Pakistan does not exceed 37 percent, the returns 
to education in the form of entry into the labor market is perceived to be low.  Thus, this 
discussion has shown that there are both cultural and economic reasons against educating 
girls at higher levels, which has to a large extent been responsible for low educational 
attainment of girls in South Asia. 
 Recent qualitative work shows however that there has been a widespread change 
in perception about girls’ education and about gender norms in general.  Today, local 
populations take great pride in the expansion of girls’ education in their areas, and in the 
impact they see of this on the community, on children’s well-being and on women’s 
empowerment (Das and Hossain, forthcoming).  How and why did this change in 
perceptions about education come about?  At the macro level, we argue that a supply side 
push for education tapped the latent demand among families of girls, which has existed 
despite what seem to be conservative norms and values.  Once the impact of education on 
girls and communities became apparent, this fueled further demand.  The access to new 
job opportunities in the garment sector and with NGOs showed families that girls can 
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have an economic worth as well.  Globally of course, higher returns to education for 
women are borne out in a number of studies including Psacharopoulos’ (1994) cross-
country review and Schultz (1994) and from such diverse settings as Taiwan (Gindling et 
al, 1994), Czech Republic and Slovakia (Chase, 1997) and India (Malathy and 
Duraisamy, 1993; Duraisamy, 2000).  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
One of the reasons why the empirical literature on changing norms in South Asia has not 
progressed much is due to limited data sets that allow for such analyses.  Individual 
questions in the Demographic and Health Surveys on attitudes to violence, fertility 
preferences and to individual diseases have allowed for some analysis of attitudes to 
these areas, but very few questions allow for an analysis of attitudes to gender inequality.  
We use a unique data set – the World Bank Survey on Gender Norms in Bangladesh 
(WBGNS) 2006, which has a number of questions on attitudes to gender equality.  Our 
aim is to understand whether two cohorts of women display differences in gender norms 
with regard to education based on two questions – “should girls be equally or better 
educated than boys” and “should wives be equally or better educated than husbands.”   
 The WBGNS 2006 is the first comprehensive nationally representative survey of 
gender norms and practices in Bangladesh.  It is based on a sample adults that include 
married women in the 15-25 and 45-59 year age range, married male heads of households 
men in the 25-50 year age range, and 500 community leaders (such as Union Parishad 
(UP) members, Imams/Moulvis (religious leaders), primary school teachers and 
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Madrasah teachers).  The samples were drawn in two stages. 91 clusters1 were selected at 
the first stage as a subsample of the 361 clusters included in the Bangladesh 
Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) of 2004. The second sampling stage selected 
one adult from each household. Opinion leaders were selected from among those who 
were resident in and around the cluster, having knowledge of and influences on the 
people of the cluster. On average 49 adults and 5-6 opinion leaders were interviewed in 
each cluster. Out of the 49 adults interviewed in a cluster, roughly 16 were married 
women age 15-25, 16 married women age 45-59 and 17 married men age 25-50. 
Interviews were conducted in April-May 2006. 
 We have two estimation samples: older women (1431 initial observations) and 
younger women (1543 initial observations).  Explanatory variables are missing for some 
observations, which cause a drop in sample sizes for the final/effective analyses samples.  
Our final samples thus are: older women (1408 observations) and younger women (1534 
observations).  Sample drops of these magnitudes do not seem to be cause for concern 
regarding the representativeness of the estimation samples.  The means for the analyses 
samples are reported in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 In analyzing the difference in patterns between the two cohorts of women in the 
sample, we capture intergenerational change.  Of course, it is entirely possible that the 
difference could well be a function of age and life-cycle and not of cohort.  That being so, 
we believe that once we control for a number of demographic characteristics, we do 
capture the effect of change over time.   
                                                 
1 A cluster is a census defined village that corresponds roughly to a mouza village in rural areas and a 
census block (part of a mohollah) in an urban area. 
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 We use two dependent variables in our analysis. Each of these represents an 
attitude to a different aspect of gender equality.  The first is whether girls should be 
equally or better educated than boys.  The second is whether wives should be equally or 
better educated than their husbands.  The share of women favoring equal or better 
education of girls changed from 77.8 percent to 85.2 percent across the two cohorts, 
while the share of women favoring equal or better education of wives changed from 49 
percent to 53.9 percent across the two cohorts (Table 2).  The gender gap in educational 
attainment appears to have narrowed over time: the “no education” group has shrunk 
from 65.3 percent for the older cohort of females to 23.6 percent for the younger cohort 
of females (Table 2).  The share of wives with less education than their husband has 
shrunk from 38.1 percent to 23.2 percent, while the share of wives with more education 
has increased from 8.2 percent to 30.2 percent (Table 3). 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Based on the theoretical literature on the pathways to change in attitudes about 
gender equality discussed previously, we use a set of explanatory variables that include 
education, region, exposure to the media and congruity with other attitudes relating to 
gender equality. Our primary explanatory variable of interest is education and we define 
its role in several different ways.  There are at least two pathways through which 
education interacts with attitudes.  First, attitude to education can affect whether and how 
much education individuals get.  Conversely, better education can change attitudes 
towards education.  There are, therefore, inherent problems in establishing a causal 
relationship here.  We can however, through the individual’s education, test whether 
higher levels of education are associated with more liberal attitudes toward gender 
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equality.  Some research from the US has found that this relationship between higher 
education and liberal attitudes is not necessarily a clear-cut one and is contingent upon a 
number of other factors and has different effects for different categories of individuals 
(Kane and Kyyro, 2001).  We use an individual’s educational attainment (coded as four 
dummies for some primary, completed primary, some secondary and secondary plus 
more, with no education being the reference category). 
 Other than the individual’s education, the household level “educatedness” may 
also have a bearing on the attitude of individuals to gender equality.  The literature on 
“social influence” and “social learning” in changing perceptions of mortality and fertility 
points to a lag between actual and perceived changes (Montgomery and Casterline, 
1996).  Koenig et al (2003) found in Bangladesh that when women’s autonomy is an 
accepted part of the community culture, violence against women decreases, we would 
expect that higher levels of aggregate education and individuals from more educated 
families, especially, where female education is higher, would be more liberal in their 
attitudes to gender equality in education.  We therefore also include spousal education as 
explanatory variable since a woman’s own views on educational equality may well be 
guided by her husband’s in a society that is overwhelmingly patriarchal.  
 Finally, for younger women we add a measure that denotes the highest education 
level of an older woman in the household.  The literature on South Asia is replete with 
analyses of the manner in which older women in the household exercise control over 
younger women.  Thus, if older sisters-in-law or the mother-in-law is more educated we 
would expect the family to “bring in” a more educated and enlightened daughter-in-law 
and thus her own attitudes would be more liberal. 
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 We use a number of individual level demographic characteristics as control 
variables.  These include age, a squared term for age and household wealth quintiles.  We 
also add a measure that denotes media exposure in terms of frequency of listening to the 
radio.  Exposure to information is a way in which norms are broken down and the 
literature on acceptance of family planning is replete with the importance of the media in 
changing attitudes and behaviors. This is especially important when the population in 
question is not educated.  Yet another explanatory variable in our analysis is a measure of 
gender equality in marriage.  In South Asia, eating order signifies a patriarchal hierarchy 
with men and elders usually eating before the rest.  We believe that if wives eat with their 
husbands they display a form of equality in marriage and that this would to some extent 
affect other attitudes about marriage.  In our sample the proportion of wives who say they 
eat with their husbands has gone up from 57.7 percent among the older cohort to 60.4 
percent in the younger sample (Table 2). 
 Finally, we include region of residence as an indicator of cultural norms as have 
other studies in the past (see, for example, Mason et al, 1976). In India, it is common to 
use region as a proxy for conservatism and the literature on regional differences is strong 
(see for instance Dyson and Moore, 1989).  Bangladesh, however, is all too often viewed 
as a homogenous entity in the development literature.  One reason for this is that national 
data sets have limited questions that can allow for the links between norms and outcomes.  
Surveys that do include this information are small in scale and do not allow for national 
generalizations to be made.  That cultural norms are regionally determined and there are 
more or less conservative areas is well-known.  For instance, Sylhet is a region fraught 
with poor indicators of women’s status and universally regarded as conservative.  Yet, it 
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is also the major sending area for migrants to, for example, the UK and the Middle East.  
Combined with the possibility of some migrants in Dhaka ending up in key leadership 
positions, its collective view may be to exercise stronger influence on policy with regard 
to women’s status.  
Estimation-wise, we note the potential endogeneity problems in terms of potential 
reverse causality between gender education norms and the different education measures, 
especially that for individual attainment.  The same potential issue exists for gender 
education norms and eating norms.  However, as we do not have available in this dataset 
any variables that may potentially act as instruments, it does not appear feasible to try to 
address this problem using instrumental variables (2SLS) methods.  As a result, we 
estimate simple probit regression must interpret any subsequent results with caution and 
hence not give them a causal interpretations but rather as merely reflecting associations 
with gender education norms.  Further, so as to allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity, the 
estimations will be carried out using Huber-White standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 
1980).  Additionally, so as to allow for the possibility that observations are correlated 
within communities the standard errors are also adjusted for within-cluster correlation 
(Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000). 
 
RESULTS 
That girls should be equally or better educated than boys is a value that the majority of 
the population espouses and this has only become more common.  The role of education 
in this is nuanced and begs the questions – whose education and what kind of education?  
Own education seems to confer egalitarian attitudes for older women and the effects are 
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strong and significant at all levels of education except the highest (possibly due to small 
cell sizes).  Education of their spouses has no effect on older women’s attitudes towards 
their sons and daughters relative education (Table 4).  For younger women, own 
education matters, too, both in substantive and statistical terms.  Once we add the 
husband’s education to the model, the coefficients drop considerably in size, leaving only 
own secondary level education statistically significant at the .05 level (M2).  Unlike for 
older women, younger women’s attitudes to educational equality among boys and girls, 
therefore, is determined to a large extent by their husband’s education.  Brewster and 
Padavic (2000) also found in the US that over time the importance of education in norm 
construction became less strong as education became more common.  As education 
becomes more common, other factors determine the attitudes of individuals. 
   [Table 4 about here]  
The older woman’s education has strong and statistically significant positive effects for 
the younger woman’s attitudes to gender equality in education (M4).  Thus, if an older 
woman in the household is more educated, younger women tend to have more egalitarian 
attitudes.  Perhaps, families that have more educated women in the household are also 
families that will bring in a more educated daughter-in-law and the overall value in that 
household will be towards greater equality in education for boys and girls.  The 
information variable indicated by radio exposure is important for older women but not for 
younger women, probably since the latter, being better educated, have other avenues for 
access to information.  Also, younger women who eat with their husbands are also more 
likely to espouse more liberal attitudes towards children’s relative education, suggesting 
that different norms and perceptions are correlated. 
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 Region of residence is the other important determinant of women’s attitudes 
towards educational equality for children.  For older women, Barisal and Chittagong are 
associated with more conservative attitudes and Sylhet with the most liberal attitudes to 
educational equality for boys and girls.  Barisal ceases to be a negative influence on 
gender norms for younger women about education as was the case for older women.  
Thus, it seems that younger women in Barisal are more liberal in this respect than older 
women.  But in Chittagong we see the same effects for younger women.  In fact, this 
thread of conservatism in Chittagong seems to be increasing, with younger women 
displaying stronger and more statistically significant results than older women.  The 
counter-intuitively positive effects of residing in Sylhet in terms of having more liberal 
gender norms about education persist strongly for younger women too.   
 Finally, household wealth status emerges as a significant determinant of norms 
towards gender equality for the children’s education for older women.  Thus, the richest 
quintile espouses the most liberal values compared to the poorest.  But for younger 
women once we control for spousal education, socioeconomic status does not matter. 
 The determinants of women’s attitudes about educational equality within 
marriage are much less clear cut (Table 5).  Neither their own education nor that of their 
spouses matters for older women’s attitudes.  And again, as in the case of attitudes 
towards girls’ and boys’ relative education, in the case of husband’s and wives’ relative 
education too, we find that listening to the radio regularly enhances older women’s liberal 
attitudes.  However, the strength of this effect is somewhat imprecisely measured 
(statistically significant at only the .05 level).  Interestingly, where we would have 
expected eating together with the husband to exercise a positive influence in gender 
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norms in marriage, we see no association for either group of women.  And socioeconomic 
status for the most part is not associated with women’s attitudes to educational equality in 
marriage. 
   [Table 5 about here] 
For younger women, a series of “life-cycle explanations” and cultural mores seem 
to explain their attitudes to educational equality in marriage.  To start with, age is highly 
significant and with increasing years, this younger cohort of women tends to become 
more liberal in their attitudes.  But their own secondary or higher education has only a 
weakly statistically significant positive effect on their attitudes.     
Adding the older woman’s education also brings out a negative effect of religion 
(as we also found for the child education norm regressions for the younger women). 
Therefore, controlling for own education, spousal education, and education of the older 
woman, we find that belonging to a Muslim household has a negative and statistically 
significant association with younger women’s attitude to equality in marriage. 
 As for regional effects, we find that living in Barisal, Rajshahi and Khulna (but 
not Chittagong) has a negative association with liberal attitudes on spousal educational 
equality for older women.  But Sylhet again shows up as having a positive association 
with older women’s attitudes to educational equality.  All these effects of region also 
persist for younger women but only until we add the older woman’s education level.  
Once we do, the effect of region is no longer significant (except Rajshahi).  Age, too, is a 
strong and significant factor in younger women’s attitudes of educational equality in 
marriage.  It appears, therefore, that younger women are under the strong influence of 
external factors.  Left to themselves they would perhaps have more egalitarian values, but 
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once we bring in the household or community values in any way, their own values 
become more conservative.  Perhaps as women grow older and acquire greater status in 
the household, complete childbearing and more “junior” women enter the household, 
their views become increasingly their own. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Perhaps the strongest result that we note in our analysis is that Bangladeshi women are 
more likely to espouse attitudes of gender equality in education for their children and less 
so about gender equality among spouses.  While there is about a 7 percentage point 
change in the attitudes of older and younger women towards giving girls equal or better 
education than boys, there is only about a 5 percentage point change in the view between 
the two cohorts that wives should have equal or better education than their husbands.  
The change itself is not the most remarkable – what is truly remarkable are the absolute 
percentages.  While a large majority of both groups of women believe in educational 
equality for children, only a little over half believe in educational equality in marriage.   
 Perhaps more important is the fact that education plays a key role in determining 
liberal attitudes about the relative education of boys and girls, but cannot explain attitudes 
about educational equality in marriage.  We believe that the two questions may perhaps 
be capturing two different issues.  While the question on relative education of boys and 
girls captures the value of education per se, the question on educational equality in 
marriage captures the norms regarding marriage and the relative worth of husbands and 
wives.  Here cultural factors denoted by region and other such variables become much 
more important.  For younger women in particular very few variables other than region 
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and age are significant determinants of their attitudes on educational equality in marriage.  
If you are a young woman in Bangladesh, perhaps your attitudes about equality in 
marriage are determined more by societal norms and the influence of elders in the family 
than your own educational level or characteristics.   Thus, “life cycle explanations” and 
cultural mores emerge as most important.  These life cycle issues have also been seen to 
be important for other outcomes, especially in health (Das Gupta, 1995) 
 The tendency towards liberalism in children’s education and conservatism in 
views about marriage (or more important, a lack of explanation about views on 
educational equality in marriage) has interesting antecedents as well as implications.  The 
general norm discussed earlier in this paper that women should be in most ways less 
accomplished than their spouses is a difficult one to break down.  We have also argued 
elsewhere that while there have been small changes in the attitudes to divorce, marriage 
in Bangladesh is by and large a stable, unchanging institution (World Bank, 2007).  In 
other South Asian countries, too, marriage patterns seem very difficult to change.  Thus, 
in Sri Lanka, Malhotra and Tsui (1996) found that modern norms had only a small 
influence on timing of marriage.  Perhaps, with greater numbers of women marrying men 
equally or less educated than them, this may change over time, too.  However, it is also 
possible that it is more acceptable to voice liberal attitudes about children’s education and 
less so about marriage and the marital relationship.   
 The importance of region as a determinant of both educational equality for boys 
and girls and husbands and wives has to be underscored.  That some regions are known to 
be conservative is pointed out earlier in this paper, but not all our results are easily 
explicable.  Sylhet, the region widely regarded as the most conservative seems to have 
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women who have inordinately liberal attitudes to gender equality in education – both for 
their children and within their own marriages.  When seen together with the low 
educational attainment of women in Sylhet this presents itself as a sort of “yearning for 
education” among women.  But Chittagong defies explanation.  It is next to Sylhet in the 
perception of conservatism and in terms of low levels of educational attainment of girls, 
and also comes across as the region with the most conservative attitudes to educational 
equality among girls and boys.2   
 
CONCLUSION 
Our results show that the far-reaching changes in Bangladesh in terms of female 
education seem to have had equally far-reaching impacts on the value of girls’ education 
relative to boys.  Education for women thus explains these liberal attitudes towards their 
children’s education.  But in terms of their attitudes to their marriages, Bangladeshi 
women are still very conservative and education has done little to change that.  We 
predict for the future that as female education expands, the demand for girls’ education 
will grow even more robust.  Also, as more wives are equal or better educated than their 
husbands, the value of equality in marriages, too, will grow. 
 
 
                                                 
2 These observations are further supported by the data on gross enrollment rates of boys and girls by level 
and region presented earlier (see Table 1), especially for lower and higher secondary. 
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Table 1.  Gross Enrollment Rates of Boys and Girls by Level and Region 
 
Name of the 
City 
Primary  
(Grade 1-5) 
Lower Sec.  
(Grade 6-8) 
Secondary  
(Grade 9-10) 
Higher Secondary 
(11-12) 
  Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Barisal 93.9 93.6 55.4 58.9 45.8 58.1 44.7 35.0 
Chittagong 83.5 84.5 48.1 58.2 37.2 49.9 34.6 32.8 
Dhaka 86.1 84.5 52.7 58.4 62.2 66.6 32.3 33.3 
Khulna 96.1 99.5 60.7 66.9 58.3 71.5 39.3 36.2 
Rajshahi 85.5 91.5 53.5 70.3 50.3 57.5 38.2 33.4 
Sylhet 83.2 85.7 57.1 36.3 39.7 58.0 29.1 28.5 
 
Source:  BANBEIS (Government of Bangladesh) 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for the (Main) Estimation Samples 
 
 Older cohort: Younger cohort: 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
     
Dependent variables:     
Girls should be equally or better educated than boys 0.778 0.416 0.852 0.355 
Wives should be equally or better educated than their husbands 0.490 0.500 0.539 0.499 
     
Explanatory variables:     
Age 49.67 4.164 21.52 2.893 
No education 0.653 0.476 0.236 0.425 
Some primary 0.137 0.344 0.172 0.378 
Primary 0.073 0.260 0.159 0.366 
Some secondary 0.090 0.286 0.328 0.470 
Secondary and above 0.048 0.213 0.105 0.306 
No education (Spouse) 0.503 0.500 0.327 0.469 
Some primary (Spouse) 0.113 0.316 0.151 0.358 
Primary (Spouse) 0.089 0.285 0.115 0.320 
Some secondary (Spouse) 0.126 0.332 0.236 0.425 
Secondary and above (Spouse) 0.168 0.374 0.171 0.376 
Listens to radio 0.210 0.407 0.297 0.457 
Islam 0.908 0.289 0.933 0.251 
Eat together 0.577 0.494 0.604 0.489 
Urban 0.477 0.500 0.497 0.500 
Barisal 0.067 0.250 0.063 0.242 
Chittagong 0.181 0.385 0.159 0.366 
Dhaka 0.332 0.471 0.309 0.462 
Khulna 0.114 0.317 0.130 0.337 
Rajshahi 0.237 0.425 0.280 0.449 
Sylhet 0.070 0.255 0.059 0.236 
N 1408 1534 
 
Notes: Calculations incorporate sampling weights and also adjust for within-community correlation/clustering (Froot, 
1989; Williams, 2000). 
Source: World Bank Survey on Gender Norms in Bangladesh (2006). 
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Table 3.  Education Equality in Marriage Across the Two Cohorts 
 
 Older cohort: Younger cohort: 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
     
Wife less than husband 0.381 0.486 0.232 0.422 
Wife and husband equal 0.537 0.499 0.466 0.499 
Wife more than husband  0.082 0.274 0.302 0.459 
N 1408 1534 
 
Notes: Calculations incorporate sampling weights and also adjust for within-community correlation/clustering (Froot, 
1989; Williams, 2000). 
Source: World Bank Survey on Gender Norms in Bangladesh (2006).
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Table 4.   Education Gender Gap Norms Probit Regression Results: Girls Vs. Boys (Marginal Effects) 
 
 Older cohort: Younger cohort: 
 
M1: Only 
own 
education 
 
 
M2: M1 + 
spousal 
education 
 
 
M3: M2 + 
eating norms 
 
 
 
M1: Only 
own 
education 
 
 
M2: M1 + 
spousal 
education 
 
 
M3: M2 + 
eating norms 
 
 
 
M4:  
M2 + Max. 
education of 
other female 
in HH 
        
Age:        
Age 0.180** 0.174** 0.174** 0.077* 0.082** 0.077** -0.066 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.040] [0.038] [0.037] [0.066] 
Age squared -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Own education:        
Some primary 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.028 0.035 0.031 0.071** 
 [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.022] [0.022] [0.029] 
Primary 0.123*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.057* 0.047 0.039 0.01 
 [0.034] [0.038] [0.038] [0.030] [0.028] [0.030] [0.040] 
Some secondary 0.106*** 0.058 0.056 0.068*** 0.047* 0.039 0.037 
 [0.036] [0.046] [0.045] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.038] 
Secondary plus 0.068 0.012 0.013 0.090** 0.068 0.06 0.103*** 
 [0.093] [0.142] [0.139] [0.037] [0.042] [0.044] [0.036] 
Spousal education:        
Some primary  0.017 0.018  -0.054 -0.051 -0.052 
  [0.029] [0.029]  [0.039] [0.039] [0.055] 
Primary  -0.066 -0.065  0.066*** 0.067*** 0.03 
  [0.052] [0.051]  [0.023] [0.022] [0.039] 
Some secondary  0.042 0.039  0.059** 0.061** 0.035 
  [0.036] [0.036]  [0.025] [0.025] [0.039] 
Secondary plus  0.097 0.095  0.047* 0.045 0.054 
  [0.059] [0.058]  [0.029] [0.029] [0.038] 
Highest education of older female in HH:        
Some primary       0.088*** 
       [0.025] 
Primary       -0.03 
       [0.067] 
Some secondary       0.078*** 
       [0.025] 
Secondary plus       0.058 
       [0.039] 
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Norms:        
Eat together   0.036   0.058**  
   [0.036]   [0.023]  
Information access / processing:        
Listens to radio 0.062** 0.061** 0.066** -0.018 -0.013 -0.008 0.01 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] 
Religion of household head:        
Islam -0.067 -0.061 -0.061 -0.064* -0.064* -0.061* -0.088*** 
 [0.054] [0.056] [0.056] [0.036] [0.034] [0.035] [0.026] 
Poverty / Wealth:        
Second -to-lowest asset score decile 0.062** 0.057** 0.060** 0 -0.002 -0.004 -0.028 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.051] 
Median asset score decile 0.039 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.024 0.027 0.002 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.040] 
Second-to-highest asset score decile 0.115*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.052 0.041 0.042 0.004 
 [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.047] 
Highest asset score decile 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.074** 0.055 0.059* -0.045 
 [0.025] [0.029] [0.029] [0.033] [0.035] [0.033] [0.063] 
Geography:        
Urban -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.006 0.01 0.023 
 [0.033] [0.032] [0.033] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.031] 
Barisal -0.145* -0.165** -0.170** -0.089 -0.086 -0.095 -0.154 
 [0.076] [0.078] [0.077] [0.064] [0.066] [0.067] [0.113] 
Chittagong -0.117** -0.122** -0.121** -0.176*** -0.154*** -0.152*** -0.278*** 
 [0.053] [0.052] [0.052] [0.055] [0.052] [0.052] [0.093] 
Khulna 0.012 0.007 0.004 -0.058 -0.047 -0.055 -0.157** 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.037] [0.036] [0.035] [0.071] 
Rajshahi -0.099* -0.109* -0.111** -0.101** -0.091** -0.090** -0.146** 
 [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.040] [0.036] [0.036] [0.066] 
Sylhet 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.113***  
 [0.040] [0.039] [0.039] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017]  
Pseudo-R2 0.112 0.119 0.121 0.0886 0.108 0.117 0.16 
N 1408 1408 1408 1534 1534 1534 611 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: one if responding that girls should be equally or better educated than boys, zero otherwise.  Terms in brackets are robust Huber-
White (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) standard errors.  Estimations also incorporate sampling weights and also adjust for within-community correlation/clustering 
(Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000).  Reference groups are ”none or below primary” (education), “Lowest asset score decile” (poverty/wealth), “Dhaka” (region). 
Source: World Bank Survey on Gender Norms in Bangladesh (2006). 
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Table 5.   Education Gender Gap Norms Probit Regression Results: Wives Vs. Husbands (Marginal Effects) 
 
 Older cohort: Younger cohort: 
 
M1: Only 
own 
education 
 
 
M2: M1 + 
spousal 
education 
 
 
M3: M2 + 
eating norms 
 
 
 
M1: Only 
own 
education 
 
 
M2: M1 + 
spousal 
education 
 
 
M3: M2 + 
eating norms 
 
 
 
M4: M2 + 
Max. 
education of 
other female 
in HH 
        
Age:        
Age -0.071 -0.074 -0.072 0.212** 0.211** 0.212** 0.248** 
 [0.119] [0.118] [0.119] [0.083] [0.085] [0.086] [0.117] 
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Own education:        
Some primary -0.026 -0.021 -0.023 0.04 0.051 0.052 0.154 
 [0.044] [0.046] [0.046] [0.049] [0.047] [0.047] [0.097] 
Primary -0.098 -0.091 -0.092 0.022 0.029 0.03 0.142 
 [0.060] [0.066] [0.066] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.096] 
Some secondary 0.074 0.072 0.071 0.024 0.03 0.031 0.103 
 [0.071] [0.074] [0.074] [0.050] [0.051] [0.052] [0.090] 
Secondary plus -0.041 -0.046 -0.047 0.118* 0.133* 0.134* 0.165 
 [0.100] [0.107] [0.107] [0.068] [0.079] [0.080] [0.119] 
Spousal education:        
Some primary  -0.022 -0.021  -0.076 -0.077 0.028 
  [0.056] [0.056]  [0.054] [0.054] [0.088] 
Primary  -0.025 -0.025  -0.036 -0.036 0.022 
  [0.059] [0.059]  [0.049] [0.049] [0.073] 
Some secondary  -0.028 -0.03  -0.004 -0.004 -0.024 
  [0.057] [0.057]  [0.051] [0.051] [0.073] 
Secondary plus  -0.001 -0.002  -0.036 -0.036 -0.016 
  [0.056] [0.056]  [0.061] [0.061] [0.085] 
Highest education of older female in HH:        
Some primary       -0.081 
       [0.083] 
Primary       -0.083 
       [0.106] 
Some secondary       -0.089 
       [0.076] 
Secondary plus       -0.026 
       [0.111] 
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Norms:        
Eat together   0.018   -0.007  
   [0.036]   [0.033]  
Information access / processing:        
Listens to radio 0.105* 0.106* 0.108** 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 
 [0.056] [0.056] [0.055] [0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.056] 
Religion of household head:        
Islam 0.05 0.049 0.049 -0.058 -0.054 -0.054 -0.227*** 
 [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.047] 
Poverty / Wealth:        
Second -to-lowest asset score decile 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.021 
 [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.085] 
Median asset score decile 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.048 0.05 0.05 0.137 
 [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.056] [0.056] [0.056] [0.085] 
Second-to-highest asset score decile 0.082 0.084 0.084 0.064 0.072 0.072 0.139 
 [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.057] [0.055] [0.055] [0.088] 
Highest asset score decile 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.099 
 [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.066] [0.065] [0.065] [0.101] 
Geography:        
Urban -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.036 
 [0.040] [0.041] [0.041] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.047] 
Barisal -0.182*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.042 
 [0.056] [0.055] [0.055] [0.046] [0.048] [0.048] [0.066] 
Chittagong -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 -0.031 
 [0.054] [0.055] [0.055] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.072] 
Khulna -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.08 
 [0.053] [0.054] [0.053] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.085] 
Rajshahi -0.220*** -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.243*** 
 [0.050] [0.051] [0.051] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.062] 
Sylhet 0.309*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.369*** 0.374*** 0.374***  
 [0.071] [0.070] [0.070] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037]  
Pseudo-R2 0.0688 0.0692 0.0694 0.0745 0.0764 0.0764 0.0707 
N 1408 1408 1408 1534 1534 1534 611 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: one if responding that girls should be equally or better educated than boys, zero otherwise.  Terms in brackets are robust Huber-
White (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) standard errors.  Estimations also incorporate sampling weights and also adjust for within-community correlation/clustering 
(Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000).  Reference groups are ”none or below primary” (education), “Lowest asset score decile” (poverty/wealth), “Dhaka” (region). 
Source: World Bank Survey on Gender Norms in Bangladesh (2006). 
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Bangladesh: More girls are enrolled in school than boys
(Gross enrollment rates from the HIES, 2005)
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